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1 B Democracy and the western regar tradition Mauro Bussani 
Introduction
The availability of democracy is usuaily presented as a prerequisite for any evaluation, be it political, economic, or legal, of any country, and as an imperative to pursue (with or without westem herp) for ail societies that do not enjoy it.
Here it cannot be discussed how politicar scientists define democracy and the bases for those definitions, nor can it be debated whether the just, is inherent in notions of democracy.r what is evident in the grobar arena, however, is that besides those who consider the non-democratic societies to be pathological, there are those who view our democracies as locar expressions of a particular culture and those who, for given places and ages, discuss the merits of different forms of government, including those of an autocratic or epistocratic nature.2 Nowadays the latter views recw in particurar in and about east Asian and Isramic societies.3 It is diffrcurt to chanenge any of these perspectives without being dogmatic and in a way that respects the cuÌtural differences of the 'others'. yet one can start by noting two points. Democracy and the Western legal tradition social body generally sharing homogeneous values. These are requirements that one cannot take for granted for the long term, particularly today, in the majority of known societies. Second, in non-democratic forms of government, there are no guarantees of the rulers' culture and pre ferences remaining in step with the changing needs of the society. The lack of adaptation to societal needs, on the one hand, does not deter authoritarian shifts aimed at imposing the ruler's views on the social body, and, on the other hand, makes it certain that its inner flexibility and receptiveness to change make democracy preferable 'over time '.4 This ought to be considered as crucial, and also biologically inevitable, if each generation, and each of us, accepts that it answers to the next and subsequent generations like a tenant to the landlord.
But the above isjust a part ofthe argument, even for our purposes. The desirability of democracy is one thing; its internal structure is another.
A fully developed discussion of non-democratic systems, and the Westem aspiration to transform them, must take into account the basic elements of our democratic societies, and the very threads from which the fabric of our democraryis woven. Doing so will unveil arguments that go in an opposite direction to that pursued by both the detractors ofdemocracy and those who believe that democrary is an easily exportable commodity. This requires us, however, to draw on the reservoir of knowledge made available by comparative law and to investigate the grounds on which mainstream arguments thrive today. This requirement is critical, even though it is usually met through analyses which are (attractive, but from our perspective) relevant only to a ceftain extent.
Law and democracy
Let us start by asking about the foundations, or, better, the prerequisites, which -from a legal point of view -have made it possible to establish and to develop our democracies. is invariably a level of 'constitutional' legality which is higher than the will of each single parriament or govemment. \Arhen these bodies, in Islamic societies as well as in the west, issue any law, they do so in their capacit5i
as organs bound by 'superior' laws, principles, and values, those embedded, respectively, in our constitutions and in the Shari'a. The cruciar point is represented by the content and, even more, by the way in which the superior constitutional structure operates, which in the west is the way(s) we know, and 'there' is given by the comprex interaction between the Shari'a and the state-posited law, the siyàsa. This is why much more than just their mere existence, or their written provisions, makes our constitutions not just a 'sacred' text, but an instrument for political battles transferred to legal grounds and then disputed or disputable before the (securar) courts.5
Going back to our question, an intuitive answer invokes the models for the selection of the rulers. This answer is incontestable, but it is not suffrcient in itself: the ways in which rulers are serected are quite variable, and may overlap witl those in force in non-democratic societies. This is why one has to turn to more consistent legal foundations. The search for the laner brings to the surface the great principìes of equality and of freedom of expression. But in addition to, and earrier than, these principres, history has assigned a prominent role to the (bundre of phenomena which in the iong run have produced) free accessibility to, and effective protection of, property rights, which have proved to be a reseryoir of duties, of rights, and, especially, of communicative resources. These resources, over time -and with the s Further, it is easy to understand the diarectic relationship which exists -in the west as well as in the Islamic countries -between civirization and regal tradition: the'secular,regar tradition is a fundamental pillarof ourcivilization, as much as the Koranic tradition is=forthe Islamic countries. In other words, within botr traditions we can observe: (r) a one-to-one correspondence betlveen the values ofcivilization and the values ofthe law; (2) the main role in the development of those varues played by the jurist -a layman in the west, a religious figure in the Islamic countries -as the maker and the messenger of that complex of rires which make up the historical and current ground ofthe different societies. see below, Democrary and the Western legal tradition recurring risks of abuses, at the expense of non-owners or small-ownershave been able to direct to the individual, and then radiate from her, vaìues and claims which ended up shaping the indMdual's legal subjectivity towards other members of society, as well as towards the public powers themselves. In fact, it is not by chance that the protection of property ri$hts has historically been tied to the idea according to which the rights belong to the indMdual as such, and not because of her membership of a family, a tribe, or a religious, ethnic, or political group. The recognition that rights and duties belong to the individual is further connected with the principle that responsibility is personal, and not to be ascribed to a group. And the latter principle is mirrored by the acknowledgement of the intangibility of the private sphere of each individual, whose protection, in tum, developed along the lines oI that afforded to properry rights.6
As to the question about the prerequisites of democracy, a second answer is closely linked to the above. Looking at the way in which it is understood in the West, democracy reveals itself as a complex of rights and duties' Legal systems, as implemented by the law-applying institutions, guarantee that these rights and duties are respected on a day-to-day basis, both by indMduals and by public institutions. It is the latter $uarantee which is a fundamental feature of our democracies. In particular, the very fact that public institutions, too, have become (over time) subject to the control of the law enables the democratic circle to open and close around individual persons. In order to discover, evaluate, and develop their own preferences, and make their own political choices, individuals need the 'communicative' resources which, in our societies, are provided by the common awareness that every person is able effectively to defend his or her rights against anybody.T
Specialism and secularism (popes and kings, millers and fullers)
Another essential clue to the understanding of 'our' democracies is that the Western mindset assigns to justice and the law an autonomous space, beyond the areas of the purely political, the purely moral, or the purely religious. An autonomy which has over the time shown a para[el aynamism on both sides of the channer,s experiencing cyclicar restrictions and erosions, but which has always entrusted history with the role of ridicuring any aftempt at its definitive suppression. Justice and raw, in turn, are nor meant as metaphysical perspectives, or conceptual nomenclatures, written texts, prisons, and taxes, but as widespread mentarity, deep-rooted tradition' a dailyvision of what regality is, and bywhom and in which ways it is to be administered.e
This social and cultural framework is another fundamentar prerequisite among those with which history entrusted us, for each of our democracies.
Unequivocally, from the twelfth century, one can grasp the autonomyro of the legal space in a bi-univocal correspondence with the widespread conviction that the administration of the law must be assigned to a class not of theologians or ideorogists, but of technocrats -the jurists. These are professionars who car4r out their activities on the basis of a speciarist knowledge, which is curtivated by the professionals themselves, and perceived by lay persons as independent from the incumbent ruler, be they a politician, a king or a religious leader. Legal culture's speciarism and secularism, acting together as a filter to the will of God and king, nave represented the fertile ground able to receive, grow and spread over ail our societies, when history has made it possible, the seeds of liberty and of equality -as prerogatives that belong to the individual and not to any other power, and that are best protected not by the sovereign or the Church, but by the law. This latter perspective also accounts for the variegr of institutionar structures, categories, and nomenclatures one can frnd in western societies themselves. Suffice it to think of the distances between monarchies and republics; between systems which are markedly free-market oriented and those which aim at 'social market' models; between common law countries and those whose tradition is'romanistic' or'civilian'. paradoxically, all these differences are possible precisely because in the westem tradition the autonomy of the legal dimension from fleeting political choices has affirmed itself as a fundamental and widespread varue. Thus the raw's autonomous evolution has been able to continue irespective of the similarities and the divergences which history brought to our societies, our political institutions, and our economies. rT
Law between'purity' and totalitarianisms
At the basis of our interpretation of the rerationships between democracy and the law there is thus a sort of circularity between individual rights and freedom, secularism and professionalism, and communicative resources and widespread mindsets.
Nobody can fail to acknowledge (as has arready been pointed out) that each of the results we are talking about is both the seed and the fruit of a combination of economic, religious, and social factors. Nor can one overlook the fact that the above account fits closery the evorution of private law -which plays the role of effective and authentic connective tissue of the fundamental relationships'with' goods, and'between' the individuals. rg
In matters such as administrative or constitutional law the influence of political factors can certainly be much more important. However, it is worth stressing that the law is -eve4rwhere -the social infrastructure of public tu Le Goff, Birth ofEurope, t66ff. r7 Gambaro and Sacco, Sistemi giuridici comparati, 65. rB seealso (2008) Democracy and the Western legal tradition and private conduits; that in our democracies the law is also the fundamental ground for the exercise of power; and therefore that, in the West, the ruler in office can be legitimately chosen, and function, only according to the law. Thus it is this technical and cultural framework that sets the background for any discussion of the'political'dimension of the ìaw.
The above also explains how misleading -in our perspective -the positivistic debate (this too, et pour cause, an all-westem debate) about the abstract 'purity' of the law having its own purpose in itseÌf turns out to be.
Purity arguments, on the one hand, deny the obvious -the law is positioned eveqrwhere in a dynamically working one-to-on€ relationship with the civilization to whose shaping it contributes and of which it is an expression.
0n the other hand, and consequently, these arguments also prove to be incapable of reaìizing how often the law is enmeshed in sets of values, whose aims are only apparently neutral.re These could be'natural', moral, or religious values2o (for the transcendentalism of which the most evident problem -on top ofthe fact that these same values can already be expressed differently when crossing a border -is, even in the west, the rate of sharing in societies whose members are less and less ready to $ather the wide gamut of their life choices under a compact vision of transcendences2r)' Or they could be the values which sustain a 'customary' law, whose pace of deveìop-ment allows at best keeping the status quo. This is why those who remind us that the battle ofvalues in any society is also fought on the field ofthe law are not mistaken; nor are they wron$ when they insist that legal systems in their What changes is the capacity of the jurists, secular or otherwise, to contribute to, or resist, the twists and tums imposed on the rules by those who govern the sociegr. In the West, unlike anywhere else, this capacitlr was consolidated through the means of a secular technocracy, becoming the main characteristic of the reìationships between power and the individual, and constituting a frrm support for the role that the law has been able to play so durably in our societies.
Among the many possible examples, there is one which is particularly worth mentioning here. Without the autonomy of the law, as interpreted above, it becomes diffrcult to explain the resilience of the legal tradition, and of the widespread mentalite underpinning it, to the rise of European totalitarian regimes, a resilience which until now has signalled a reliable promise to overcome any autocratic episode: a sort of biotic serum against the totalitarianism23 which Western law, on its own, of course, lacks the means to prevent, but has so far had the strength to relegate to history quite quickly. It is by these means that we can understand the relative ease with which democracy eamed its place in Italy and in Germany after the Second Democracy and the Western legal tradition World War. It is for these same reasons that associating, without an analysis such as this one, the Italian or the German experiences2a and the Iraqi or Afghan course towards democracy appears to be an argument much more inclined to the grotesque, than to any possible opportunism.
Wherever democracy prevailed, it did so after a demanding and costly struggle, whose winners did not simply aim -as too often happens around the world today -to level the legal ground for the adoption of market devices.25 But this victory could not have been won had the battlefield not been cleared of the political and religious transcendentalism, and had the legal tradition we mentioned, its techno-structure, and its professionals not been available. These winning conditions must be emphasized as the most reliable indicator of what the West is, as compared to what it is not, and as the key difference between those places where democracy could take root within a reasonable time, and those where the road to it risks leading into a cul-de-sac, or to rather long and bumpy detours.
